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I. INTRODUCTION
"Join an all female Obgyn practice in the Columbus suburbs," states
one job posting on obgyn.net, a comprehensive website for obstetrician-
gynecologists ("OB-GYNs").' "Join all female Obg group 20 minutes
outside San Francisco," states another.2 Yet a third posting comes from an
Atlanta "privately owned all female group [that] wants to add another
Obgyn."3 A recent issue of Boston Magazine contains an advertisement
from About Women By Women, P.C., a medical practice located in
Wellesley, Massachusetts that describes itself as offering "[f]emale
OB/GYNs specializing in Obstetrics, Gynecology, [and] Infertility"; 4 the
practice's website explicitly states that it has an "all-female staff.",
5
As the above examples illustrate, the face of the typical OB-GYN
practice is changing rapidly. Over the past ten years, women have gone
from filling slightly less than half of the nation's OB-GYN residencies to
filling more than two-thirds of them.6  All-female OB-GYN medical
t Associate, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, New York. Law Clerk to Chief
Judge William G. Young, United States District Court of Massachusetts (2002-03). J.D.,
magna cum laude, Harvard Law School (2002). B.A., summa cum laude, Yale University
(1999). I thank Christine Jolls and Elizabeth Bartholet for their helpful comments on drafts
of this article.
1. Posting of National Physicians Placement Services (Columbus, OH) to
http://www.obgyn.net/cfm/jobs/obs.cfm (Apr. 17, 2002) (copy on file with author).
2. Posting of National Physicians Placement Services (San Francisco, CA) to
http://www.obgyn.net/cfm/jobs/obs.cfm (Apr. 29, 1999) (copy on file with author).
3. Posting of National Physicians Placement Services (Atlanta, GA) to
http://www.obgyn.net/cfm/jobs/obs.cfm (Feb. 14, 2001) (copy on file with author).
4. About Women By Women, P.C., BOSTON MAG., Aug. 2003, at 176.
5. About Women By Women, P.C., available at http://www.aboutwomenby
women.yourmd.com.
6. Tamar Lewin, Women's Health is No Longer a Man's World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
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practices have risen in popularity.7 Job openings frequently express
preferences for female applicants-sometimes, as illustrated above, by
describing the medical practice as an all-female group.8 Female OB-GYNs
are sometimes offered higher starting salaries, 9 and numerous physicians
report that male medical students are being discouraged from entering the
field.1 ° A recent New York Times article highlighted the case of one male
OB-GYN, David Garfinkel, who was terminated less than two years after
he was hired by Morristown Obstetrics after allegedly having been told that
because he was a male, he "wasn't drawing as many patients as they had
expected."" Dr. Garfinkel responded by suing the medical practice for
gender discrimination.
12
Obstetrician-gynecologists widely recognize the phenomenon, but
vary in their responses to it. Some view the change as entirely appropriate.
They argue that the intimate nature of the specialty prompts women to seek
out physicians of the same sex, both because they feel more comfortable,
2001, at Al (stating that in 2001 women filled 70.3 percent of the nation's OB-GYN
residencies, compared with slightly less than half ten years ago). In 1980, women
accounted for only one-third of first-year OB-GYN residents. Susan Ladd, OB/GYN: A
Woman's Place?, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., Sept. 20, 1996, at D1.
7. See, e.g., Kate Stone Lombardi, A Clinic Where All the Doctors Are Women, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2000, at WE8 (explaining that the rising need for female doctors has led to
the rise of all-female practices).
8. See, e.g., Ann Carnahan, A Woman's World: Female OB/GYNs Can Name Their
Ticket, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 23, 2000, at 8F (stating that female OB-
GYNs are heavily recruited over their male counterparts); Bob Condor, Women
Obstetricians Have Male Counterparts on Run, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 1996, at 1 (referring to
a second-year resident who stated that recruitment advertisements clearly express a
preference for female applicants).
9. See, e.g., Carnahan, supra note 8, at 10F (noting a statement by Daniel Stem, the
president of the National Association of Physician Recruiters, that clients of his company
are paying more for female OB-GYNs who have just finished their residencies, with men
receiving offers from $140,000 to $160,000, and women receiving up to $175,000 with
signing bonuses); Sally Jacobs, No Men Need Apply: As Demand Soars for Female
Gynecologists, Males Search For Work, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1996, at 57 (stating that
medical practices may offer women salaries that are twenty percent higher than those
offered to men). These disparities are generally explained on the grounds that women
attract more customers and build their employers' practices more quickly. Id. at 60.
10. See, e.g., Jamie Jordan, A Question of SEX: Are Male OB/GYN Specialists
Becoming an Endangered Species?, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, IL), June 24, 1996, at 13
(noting that a male OB-GYN who began practicing in 1987 stated that he had been advised
by many people against going into gynecology); Lewin, supra note 6, at A14 (quoting,
among others, a young male OB-GYN who stated that he was "discouraged from becoming
a gynecologist at every step of the process"). Such statements contrast interestingly with the
experience of Dr. Vanessa Haygood, who entered the OB-GYN field in 1982, and noted that
at that time, "it wasn't a specialty in which women were welcomed." Ladd, supra note 6, at
D1.
11. Lewin, supra note 6, at Al.
12. Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 773 A.2d 665 (N.J.
2001).
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and because they believe that their health concerns can be more fully
understood by a doctor who has physically undergone the same
experiences." Other OB-GYNs-both female and male-are troubled by
the phenomenon, arguing that it reflects reverse discrimination and bad
medicine. "'It's unrealistic for women to say that their doctor has to have
gone through labor to understand labor.... They'd never expect their
cancer doctor to have had cancer'," stated one female OB-GYN.
14
As this trend continues, increasing numbers of male OB-GYNs may
bring gender discrimination cases to court, just as Dr. Garfinkel has. But
how will-and how should-these cases be resolved? In fact, courts have
not yet ruled on the precise question of whether an OB-GYN practice can
make explicitly gender-based decisions about which physicians to hire and
fire. The few cases that have included gender discrimination causes of
action brought by male OB-GYNs have been resolved on other grounds, 5
and the New Jersey courts have not yet addressed this aspect of Dr.
Garfinkel's case. Meanwhile, although commentators have-both in a
cluster of articles published in the 1970s and 1980s16 and in a recent
13. See, e.g., Ladd, supra note 6, at DI (quoting a female OB-GYN as stating that
"'[tihings many patients say to me are, "I feel like you know what I'm talking about." "I
feel like you could have been in this position."... They're just more comfortable from a
physical and emotional standpoint."'). Similarly, one New York Times article included the
following reflection from a female OB-GYN who practices in an all-female practice:
There's a lot of very fine male gynecologists out there, but many women find it
easier to talk to another woman when the subject is sexuality or menopause or
pregnancy ... And it's perfectly understandable. Find me a lot of men who'll
go to a female urologist for their yearly prostate exam .... [M]any of our
patients tell us how glad they are to be able to see women, who know exactly
what they're going through.
Lewin, supra note 6, at A14. See also Nicole Peradotto, In Choosing A Doctor, More
Women Are Putting Gender First, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 24, 1998, at ID (quoting a female
OB-GYN as stating that "'[s]ometimes women perceive that they're not being taken
seriously by the medical establishment and that their complaints, such as PMS, are not
considered well-founded by science .... Unless you've lived through it, you can't
understand it."').
14. Lewin, supra note 6, at Al.
15. See infra pp. 389-91 (discussing Underkofler v. Cmty. Health Care Plan, Inc., No.
99-7838 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19040, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2000) and Veleanu v. Beth
Israel Med. Ctr., 98 Civ. 7455 (VM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13948, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
24, 2000)).
16. See generally Carolyn S. Bratt, Privacy and the Sex BFOQ: An Immodest Proposal,
48 ALB. L. REV. 923 (1984); Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party
Privacy Interests: An Analytical Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54
FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1985-86); Kenneth W. Kingma, Comment, Sex Discrimination
Justified Under Title VII Privacy Rights in Nursing Homes, 14 VAL. U. L. REV. 577 (1979-
80); Elsa M. Shartsis, Comment, Privacy as Rationale for the Sex-Based BFOQ, 1985
DETROIT C. L. REV. 865 (1985); Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1977).
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resurgence of commentary on the subject17-generally attacked the notion
of accommodating customers' privacy-based preferences, they have given
scant attention to the reasons for, and the implications of, the recent trend
towards female OB-GYNs.
The first court that does have to address the precise question of gender
preferences in the OB-GYN context will face some complex questions
about anti-discrimination law and its desirable reach. Under Section 703 of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is an unlawful employment practice to
treat individuals differently because of their sex. But Title VII also
justifies differential treatment where sex is a "bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise."' 9 The current formulation of this standard states
that in order to qualify as a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ"),
a job qualification must relate to the "essence" or "central mission" of the
employer's business.2° Courts will thus have to determine whether female
sex is a BFOQ for practicing as an OB-GYN. This article both explores
this specific question and, more broadly, proposes a new framework under
which questions like these should be considered. In so doing, it reaches a
conclusion opposite to that advanced by the majority of commentators who
have written on the subject, some within the past year.
The question of whether there should be male OB-GYNs is not an
easy one. In general, customer preferences for a particular gender do not
alone justify a BFOQ. In the gender context, BFOQs are traditionally
found when a particular gender is necessary for "authenticity or
genuineness" (as in the case of an actor);2' when certain sex-related
characteristics are physically necessary to do the job-at-hand (as in the case
of a sperm donor or a Playboy bunny 22); or when only one gender is
physically capable of safely performing the job-at-hand (as in the case of a
parole officer in a maximum-security male prison).23 Courts differentiate
17. See generally Jillian B. Berman, Note, Defining the "Essence of the Business": An
Analysis of Title VII's Privacy BFOQ After Johnson Controls, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
749(2000); Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 112 YALE L. J. 1257 (2003); Sharon M. McGowan, The Bona Fide Body: Title VII's
Last Bastion of Intentional Sex Discrimination, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77 (2003).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994).
20. See infra p. 369.
21. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (discussing situations in which sex-linked elements of a job predominate); see also
Sirota, supra note 16, at 1059-60 (discussing the interpretation of the
authenticity/genuineness BFOQ).
22. See, e.g., Wilson, 517 F. Supp at 301 (noting the female BFOQ for Playboy
bunnies).
23. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-37 (1977) (holding that an
Alabama regulation under which women could not be hired as correctional counselors in
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these cases from ones in which consumers merely prefer to be served by
employees of a particular gender, as in the case of airline passengers who
generally enjoy being served by female flight attendants,24 or even in the
case of a company with many Latin American associates who would refuse
2-5to deal with a female in a management position.
Within the general rule that customer preferences for a particular
gender do not justify a BFOQ, however, is a small exception generally
known as the "privacy BFOQ." This exception holds that in certain
instances, consumers' privacy interests can justify sex-based employment
discrimination. The Supreme Court itself has not yet addressed the issue of
whether customer privacy-based preferences can ever give rise to a
BFOQ.26 A number of lower courts, however, have found that customer
privacy interests in prisons, restrooms, and-most importantly for the
purposes of this article-healthcare institutions are sufficient to create a
BFOQ.27 For example, several courts have held that hospitals are entitled
28to employ only female nurses in their labor and delivery units.
Even so, the case of the male OB-GYN presents a unique situation.
As this article will discuss, in the cases where lower courts have found
privacy BFOQs in the healthcare context, an important part of their
reasoning typically relates to tradition-that is, the view that certain
situations (for example, bathing an elderly woman in a nursing home)
implicate bodily modesty interests that are so fundamental, ingrained, and
deeply held that being of a particular gender is virtually necessary for
effective job performance. By contrast, there is no question that male OB-
GYNs are capable of performing their jobs; until recently, they were the
norm. Although bodily modesty interests are certainly implicated in a
gynecological examination, women's long history of using male OB-GYNs
contact positions at maximum-security all-male prisons was justified under the BFOQ
exception).
24. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971)
(holding that being female is not a BFOQ for a flight attendant position); Wilson, 517 F.
Supp. at 296, 304 (holding that being female is not a BFOQ for a flight attendant).
25. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
being male is not a BFOQ for a management position in a Latin American company even if
many clients would refuse to deal with a female manager).
26. See, e.g., Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 n.4 (1991)
(stating that the Supreme Court has not addressed whether customer privacy-based
preferences can give rise to a BFOQ).
27. See infra Part III (discussing privacy BFOQs created by several lower courts).
28. See EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12256, at *11-*13 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (holding that gender-based discrimination
against male labor and delivery nurses was justified because of the expectant mother's
personal privacy interest); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981)
(upholding a BFOQ for female labor and delivery nurses), vacated on other grounds by 671
F.2d 1100. 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1982); see also infra pp. 373-77.
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demonstrates that these interests are not prohibitive in this context. Indeed,
it seems clear that the choice of a female OB-GYN reflects a preference,
not a literal necessity.
There are thus three potential paths toward resolving this issue. First,
courts could "hold the line" and essentially keep the status quo in place;
that is, they could refuse to extend the privacy BFOQ to this context,
reasoning that even if female sex has been held to be a BFOQ for labor
nursing positions, the prevalence of males in the OB-GYN field renders it
absurd to declare female sex a BFOQ for OB-GYNs. Second, courts could
contract the privacy BFOQ, reasoning that female sex should be a BFOQ
for neither labor nurses nor OB-GYNs, given that men are capable of
providing the healthcare services at the essence of these businesses. This is
the path advocated by many commentators, who argue that the privacy
BFOQ is fundamentally inconsistent with anti-discrimination law.' 9 Third,
courts could expand the privacy BFOQ, holding that female sex is a
legitimate BFOQ for both labor nurses and OB-GYNs.
This article argues that the first path is both untenable and undesirable.
For the doctrine to develop to the point that female sex is a BFOQ for a
labor nurse-but not for the physician delivering the baby-would be
profoundly inconsistent with Title VII. After all, the lack of a long history
of female OB-GYNs (in contrast to the longstanding prevalence of female
midwives and labor nurses) is directly related to the gender biases that used
to dominate medicine.3 ° Allowing these divergent histories to play a
dispositive role in the analysis would therefore be deeply ironic. Moreover,
the article argues that the general prevalence and long history of male OB-
GYNs actually cuts both ways in the analysis. On the one hand, the
predominance of males in the field makes the claim that female sex as a
BFOQ for OB-GYNs seems incongruous, even somewhat silly. On the
other hand, the fact that women are choosing female OB-GYNs in spite of
the longstanding predominance of male OB-GYNs-and even in spite of
their own personal history of using male OB-GYNs, often for many
years-suggests that something other than uninformed, unthinking
prejudice is at work here. Given that malignant biases were the
fundamental evil against which Title VII was directed, it is strange indeed
that indications of their absence could work in favor of finding a Title VII
violation.
Although this article therefore argues strongly against treating labor
nurses and OB-GYNS differently in the BFOQ analysis, it recognizes that a
real choice still remains between the second path (rejecting the privacy
29. See infra pp. 381-83 (discussing these commentators' positions).
30. See JUDITH WALZER LEAVITr, BROUGHT To BED: CHILD-BEARING IN AMERICA,
1750-1950, 110-12 (1986) (noting that in 1900, only six percent of physicians in the United
States were women).
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BFOQ for both jobs) and the third path (expanding it so that it covers both
types of jobs). This article argues in favor of the third path, and more
generally, in favor of expanding the privacy BFOQ to protect interests
other than bodily modesty. Although the article does not argue that
differential pay is warranted---once a male OB-GYN is hired, for example,
the law does and should require his employer to pay him the same salary
and benefits as a similarly-situated female 3 -it does argue that employers
should, in certain instances, be permitted to make hiring and firing
decisions that take employee gender into account, even when physical
modesty interests are not at stake. In making this argument, the article
closely analyzes the nature of the trend toward female OB-GYNs, an
assessment that is absent from recent commentators' articles on the subject.
This conclusion departs not only from the majority of commentators'
positions, but also from case law precedent. As this article discusses in
detail, courts have typically focused their inquiry only on whether a bodily
modesty interest is implicated in the business. This article argues,
however, that rather than making customer nudity the sine qua non for the
establishment of a privacy BFOQ, courts should instead apply a broad,
three-pronged test.
The first prong of this test would examine whether the customer
preference is for same-gender service, as opposed to a general preference
of male and female customers for a position to be filled by employees of
only one gender (e.g., a general preference among airline passengers for
female flight attendants). This article contends that preferences for same-
gender care should be less presumptively suspect, because they do not
necessarily rest on general stereotypes about the sexes (e.g., that only men
should be firefighters, or that only females should be nurses) and because
they have less potential to keep one gender entirely out of a certain field of
employment. The second prong requires that the business at issue
implicate privacy and/or therapeutic interests that are gender-related.32
31. Doing otherwise is prohibited by the Equal Pay Act, which provides that:
No employer... shall discriminate... between employees on the basis of sex
by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate
at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment
for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex ....
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1998).
32. For example, the business at issue might frequently involve discussions between its
customers and employees about intimate sexual concerns, or might require its employees to
serve as role models for an all-female or all-male clientele. Whether or not a specific
position implicates gender-related privacy or therapeutic interests would require a context-
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This criterion thus expands the existing privacy BFOQ standard because it
can be met by interests other than bodily modesty. Finally, as a backstop,
the third prong requires that the preference for same-gender service not
derive from malignant gender stereotypes (e.g., that women are less
intelligent than men, or do not belong in positions of authority).
This article argues that when these three criteria have been satisfied,
courts should be willing to recognize a BFOQ on the basis of customer
preference. This revised BFOQ might continue to be referred to as the
"privacy BFOQ" (with an understanding that it has been broadened to
encompass "psychological privacy" interests). Alternatively, it could be
referred to as a "privacy BFOQ" when privacy interests are primarily
driving the preference for same-gender care, and as a "therapeutic BFOQ"
when the interests at issue are more therapeutic in nature.33
Under this revised BFOQ test, female sex would be recognized as a
BFOQ for OB-GYNs, and medical practices would not be liable for
favoring female OB-GYNs in employment decisions. This reformulation
of the BFOQ defense would also have implications beyond the specific
question of the male OB-GYN. By explicitly moving beyond the current
formulation of the privacy BFOQ defense, it would allow far more gender-
based employment decisions than are currently permissible in the law.
Most obviously, it would have dramatic implications in the healthcare
context, not only in medical practices, but also in settings such as mental
health facilities and gyms, since these businesses also frequently implicate
gender-related privacy and/or therapeutic interests, which in turn often
prompt customer preferences for same-gender care. Depending on the
specific context, such preferences can often stem from the heightened
ability for the caregiver to serve as a role model, the greater comfort in
discussing intimate concerns with the caregiver, and/or the caregiver's
shared physicality and firsthand experience with the same gender-related
concerns that his or her customers or patients have. This revised BFOQ
would permit employers to respond to these preferences even when no
nudity on the part of the customer is involved.
Such an expansion of the privacy BFOQ would be consistent with the
purposes of Title VII and the BFOQ exception. This article argues that
within the context of gender discrimination, Title VII should be interpreted
fundamentally as preventing gender-based employment decisions that are
specific inquiry.
33. Of course, as illustrated infra, the distinction between privacy and therapeutic
interests are not always obvious; a woman's discomfort in discussing intimate sexual
concerns with a male physician could be seen as embodying both types of interests. Other
times, the distinction is clearer; nurse and nurse's aide positions typically implicate only
privacy interests, whereas counselor positions with significant role-modeling functions fall
more into the "therapeutic" category.
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based on and/or perpetuate malignant and detrimental characterizations of
the sexes. The very fact that a BFOQ exception exists in the gender
discrimination context-as opposed to the racial discrimination context, in
which there is no such exception-underscores this point. Thus, when the
job at issue truly implicates privacy or therapeutic concerns that are gender-
related, and the evidence indicates that customer preferences derive from
these concerns rather than malignant gender biases, it is consistent with
Title VII and the "essence of the business standard" 34 to recognize gender
as a BFOQ.
As mentioned above, and as discussed at greater length in this article,
there are a number of ways that same-gender care in certain professions-
particularly the healthcare professions-can directly lead to increased
effectiveness in the services provided. Moreover, it is particularly
appropriate that this article's proposed reformulation would expand the
BFOQ defense in the healthcare world, given that (as is shortly discussed in
greater detail) Title VII's legislative history reveals that Congress
recognized the heightened importance of the BFOQ defense in the
healthcare setting. This article is thus limited to delineating and analyzing
how the reformulated BFOQ would play out in the healthcare context,
particularly using the case study of the male OB-GYN. The proposal,
however, is general in nature and is certainly applicable to other
employment settings that implicate gender-related privacy or therapeutic
concerns.
The article proceeds in three main parts. First, it discusses the general
case law surrounding customer preferences for a particular gender, looking
at the enactment and development of the BFOQ defense, particularly in the
context of customer preferences. It argues that the courts' general rejection
of the customer preference rationale for BFOQs was entirely appropriate,
given that these preferences typically reflected malignant gender biases-
most often, chauvinistic attitudes that result in female subordination.
Second, the article examines the rise of the privacy BFOQ. It argues
that the courts were correct in recognizing the privacy BFOQ, given the
qualitatively different nature of the customer preferences at issue in these
cases. It acknowledges that the critical commentary regarding the privacy
BFOQ is largely negative, but suggests that these commentators tend to
incorrectly assume that customer preferences for same-gender healthcare
necessarily derive from unconscious prejudices about "appropriate" gender
roles and women's sexual vulnerability. In making this argument, the
article highlights the reasons that actual patients of female OB-GYNs have
given for preferring same-gender gynecological care. Moreover, the article
argues that courts have not gone far enough in recognizing BFOQs in the
34. See infra pp. 369-72 (describing the essence of the business standard).
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healthcare context. In so doing, it identifies cases in which courts
explicitly refused to find a gender BFOQ despite the considerable gender-
related therapeutic interests implicated by the employment position in
question, simply because of their belief that only bodily privacy interests
could justify a BFOQ. The article suggests that the privacy BFOQ should
be broadened, based on the three criteria described above, to cover a wider
range of cases.
The article's final section turns to the specific issues surrounding the
male OB-GYN. It analyzes how a discrimination lawsuit brought by a
male OB-GYN would likely be addressed under the current doctrine, and
then evaluates how the case would be considered under the reformulated
BFOQ.
II. OVERVIEW: CUSTOMER PREFERENCES AND THE GENDER BFOQ
The BFOQ defense to gender-based discrimination was added to the
Civil Rights Act35 on February 10, 1964, in the House's final stages of
deliberation over the Act.36 Representative Goodell of New York, noting
that the Act already included a BFOQ defense for religious and national
origin discrimination, suggested amending it to include sex as well.
Interestingly enough, Representative Goodell appealed specifically to the
healthcare world, stating:
There are so many instances where the matter of sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification. For instance, I think of an elderly
woman who wants a female nurse. There are many things of this
nature which are bona fide occupational qualifications, and it
seems to me they would be properly considered here as an
exception.37
The amendment was soon added, with the drafter of the original BFOQ
defense indicating that his initial omission of sex had simply been an
oversight. No opposition to the BFOQ defense is apparent from the
Congressional Record; support for the change appears to have been
18unanimous. Indeed, after the alteration was made, one legislator-
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1994).
36. See generally Sirota, supra note 16, at 1027-33 (describing the legislative history
behind the inclusion of Title VII sex discrimination and BFOQ provisions into the Civil
Rights Act of 1964). Title VII was extended to prohibit sex discrimination on February 8,
1964. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("[T]his amendment is
offered to the fair employment practices title of this bill to include within our desire to
prevent discrimination against another minority group, the women .... "). The BFOQ was
expanded to cover sex on February 10, 1964. Id. at 2718.
37. Id. at 2718 (statement of Rep. Goodell).
38. Id. at 2718 (indicating that there was a "unanimous-consent request that those
words be added").
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Representative Green of Oregon-reiterated the importance of the BFOQ
defense to gender-based discrimination in the healthcare world. She posed
the following hypothetical:
In a large hospital an elderly woman needs special round-the-
clock nursing. Her family is seeking to find a fully qualified
registered nurse. It does not make any difference to this family if
the nurse is a white or a Negro or a Chinese or a Japanese if she
is fully qualified. But it does make a great deal of difference to
this elderly woman and her family as to whether this qualified
nurse is a man or a woman. Under the terms of the amendment
adopted last Saturday [whereby Title VII was expanded to
prohibit gender discrimination] the hospital could not advertise
for a woman registered nurse because under the amendment by
the gentleman from Virginia [Rep. Smith] this would be
discrimination based on sex. The suggestion of the gentleman of
New York [Rep. Goodell] helped a great deal, however.39
The only other elaboration of the BFOQ defense in Title VH's
legislative history can be found in two related documents that were
submitted to Congress on April 8, 1964. The first, an Interpretive
Memorandum on Title VII submitted by Senators Clark and Case on April
8, 1964, stated:
[I]t would not be an unlawful employment practice to hire or
employ employees of a particular religion, sex, or national origin
in those situations where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification for the job. This exception must
not be confused with the right which all employers would have to
hire and fire on the basis of general qualifications for the job,
such as skill or intelligence. This exception is a limited right to
discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin where
the reason for the discrimination is a bona fide occupational
qualification. Examples of such legitimate discrimination would
be the preference of a French restaurant for a French cook, the
preference of a professional baseball team for male players, and
the preference of a business which seeks the patronage of
members of particular religious groups for a salesman of that
religion.n°
The second was a memorandum prepared by Senator Clark in response to
41various questions that had previously been posed by Senator Dirksen.This dialogue reads as follows:
39. Id. at 2720 (statement of Rep. Green).
40. Id. at 7213.
41. Id. at 7217 (statement of Sen. Clark).
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Question. Now I turn to discrimination on account of sex.
Frankly, I always like to discriminate in favor of the fairer sex. I
hope that the might of the Federal Government will not enjoin me
from such discrimination. But let us look further at this
provision. Historically, discrimination because of sex has been a
protective discrimination because we do not believe that women
should do heavy manual labor of the sort which falls to the lot of
some men. This is not true, of course, in some other countries
where we see pictures of women working on the roads and in the
mines. Then, too, we discriminate in favor of women because of
nimble abilities in many fields, such as the assembly of radios
and delicate instruments and machines. Where the discrimination
is not in the best interest of the fairer sex we have approached the
problem by specific prohibitions such as the requirement of equal
pay for women doing the same work as men.
Answer. Wherever sex is a bona fide qualification or
disqualification for a particular job, [T]itle VII does not require
42
that equal job opportunity be given to both sexes.
Thus, the legislative history of the BFOQ (scant though it is)-along
with the relatively permissive statutory language that gender-based
discrimination is permissible when "sex... is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise"43-suggests that Congress intended the
BFOQ defense to have a fairly broad effect. As Michael Sirota notes,
however, since the Civil Rights Act's passage, "[b]oth the courts and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] have interpreted the
BFOQ provision narrowly... and have allowed BFOQs only in very
limited circumstances.""
Indeed, the general rule regarding gender-based BFOQs is that
customer preferences are insufficient to create a BFOQ. This rule derives
from the conjunction of two seminal Fifth Circuit cases: the 1969 case of
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.45 and the 1971 case of
46
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. The Weeks court, evaluating a
BFOQ question in a context not involving customer preferences, framed
the issue as whether the employer could demonstrate "a factual basis for
believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved. 4 7 Two years later, the
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
44. See Sirota, supra note 16, at 1026.
45. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
46. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
47. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235.
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Diaz court, evaluating a BFOQ question in the customer preference
context, elaborated on this standard. It stated that customer preferences for
a particular gender could justify a BFOQ "only when the essence of the
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex
exclusively. 48
Together, the Weeks and Diaz tests can be seen as creating a two-
pronged-and very stringent-inquiry. 9  One prong involves the
assessment of whether the job duties under consideration require that the
worker be of one sex only (that is, whether only one sex can perform those
duties safely and efficiently). The other prong-which has generally
become the dominant prong in assessing BFOQ claims-examines whether
those duties are reasonably necessary to convey the essence of the
employer's business.
Applying this rigorous standard, courts have repeatedly rejected the
argument that customer preferences can justify a gender-based BFOQ. For
the most part, such cases have arisen in contexts where customer
preferences for or against women have reflected-either subtly or
overtly-chauvinistic attitudes toward females as subservient, inferior,
and/or worthy of objectification. The Diaz case itself provides a good
example of the attitude towards women that often drove these preferences.
There, the defendant employer, Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan
Am), argued that female sex was a BFOQ for flight attendants because
passengers "overwhelmingly preferred to be served by female
stewardesses."5° Pan Am highlighted female flight attendants' allegedly
superior abilities in the non-mechanical aspects of the job, such as
"providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous
personalized service and, in general, making flights as pleasurable as
possible. ....5' The Diaz court appropriately rejected the argument that
customers' preferences that they be served by women justified a BFOQ,
explaining that the "primary function of an airline is to transport passengers
safely from one point to another" and that female flight attendants' superior
abilities to enhance the flight environment were only tangential to that
function. 2
In other cases, stereotypic attitudes regarding women's "proper place"
have even more blatantly shaped preferences for employees of a particular
48. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
49. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 234-36 (5th Cir. 1976)
(describing in greater detail the relevant inquiry under the Weeks and Diaz tests); Wilson v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (describing the Weeks and
Diaz decisions as having "given rise to a two step BFOQ test.").
50. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387 (summarizing evidence submitted by Pan Am in regard to its
experience with hiring male and female cabin attendants).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 388.
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gender. In Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.,53 for example, Wynn Oil Company
(Wynn) argued that being male was a BFOQ for a particular management
position that required significant contact with its Latin American
distributors and clients. 4 Wynn argued that a female would not be able to
attract and do business with the company's Latin American associates
because many of them "would be offended by a woman conducting
business meetings in her hotel room. 5 5 Wynn's regional manager stated
explicitly that a woman in a high-level management position would not be
accepted by these associates because "of the prevalent mores relating to the
proper roles of men and women in those countries. 56 The district court,
applying Diaz, concluded that male gender was indeed a BFOQ for the
position, stating that "[a]s quaint as that notion appears to the American
mind, it is a very real and formidable obstacle to the success of any
business enterprise in South America. 5 7 The Ninth Circuit, however,
disagreed, stating that "stereotypic impressions of male and female roles do
not qualify gender as a BFOQ" and that foreign customs should not be
permitted to limit the enforcement of Title VII in the United States."
Although the Ninth Circuit did affirm the district court's ruling on other
grounds,59 it left no doubt that in its view, the facts presented by Wynn did
not give rise to a BFOQ.
Diaz and Fernandez both illustrate how traditional conceptions about
the genders' "proper roles" can lead to preferences for employees of a
particular gender. The case of Wilson v. Southwest Airlines 
Co. 60
meanwhile, illustrates how objectifying attitudes toward women can also
result in such preferences. Southwest Airlines Co. (Southwest), whose
clientele primarily included male businessmen, adopted a marketing
strategy whereby it actively promoted its ability to provide "tender loving
care" to its passengers.6' It dressed its flight attendants in "high boots and
hot-pants," featured them in advertisements designed to showcase their
attractiveness, and encouraged them to "maintain an atmosphere of
53. No. CV-78-0160, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10704 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1979), aft'd,
653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981).
54. Fernandez, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *3-*5. Wynn did not acknowledge that it
had discriminated on the basis of gender in the plaintiff's case; it merely argued that if it had
done so, the BFOQ defense would have protected it. Id. at *3.
55. Id. at *4.
56. Id. at *5.
57. Id. at *10-*11.
58. Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981).
59. The court agreed with Wynn's contention, and the finding of the district court, that
Wynn's decision not to promote the plaintiff had been based not on her gender, but rather on
her lack of qualifications. Id. at 1275-76.
60. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
61. Id. at 294.
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,,62
informality and 'fun' during flights. When faced with a claim of gender
discrimination brought by rejected male applicants, Southwest argued that
having exclusively female flight attendants was essential to its business
because of its identity as the "love airline., 63 The district court, however,
concluded that even if Southwest's "love image" had indeed enhanced its
ability to attract passengers, being female still did not constitute a BFOQ
for these positions. 64  The court emphasized that despite Southwest's
marketing strategy, its primary business function was still the
transportation of passengers, 65 and that "sex does not become a BFOQ
merely because an employer chooses to exploit female sexuality as a
marketing tool, or to better insure profitability. 66
The courts have thus appropriately made clear, through their rigorous
application of the "essence of the business" test, that customer preferences
deriving from chauvinistic or biased attitudes will not justify gender
BFOQs. Although the Supreme Court has not itself addressed a case in
which a BFOQ was alleged to exist based on customer preferences, its
statements on the general subject of BFOQs have indicated its approval of
the "essence of the business" test, and its belief that BFOQs should be
67construed narrowly. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, for example, the Court
stated that "the bfoq exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow
exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex,"
and that Title VII was intended to prohibit the refusal "to hire an individual
woman or man on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.,
68
In the Court's most recent ruling on the BFOQ standard, Automobile
69Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. , the majority framed its opinion around
the "essence of the business" standard, holding invalid employer Johnson
Controls' practice of excluding women who were capable of childbearing
from battery-making jobs that exposed them to lead.70  The Court
emphasized that in order to qualify as a BFOQ, a job qualification must
relate to the "'essence"' or to the "central mission of the employer's
business."'" Since the women's fertility did not "actually interfere[] with
[their] ability to perform the job' 72 of battery-making, the Court concluded
that being a male (or a woman whose inability to bear children was
62. Id. at 295.
63. Id. at 294-95.
64. Id. at 302-03.
65. Id. at 302.
66. Id. at 303.
67. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
68. Id. at 333-34.
69. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
70. Id. at211.
71. Id. at 203 (quoting Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985)).
72. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204.
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medically documented) did not constitute a BFOQ.73
Thus, there is clearly a widely-enforced presumption against allowing
customer preferences to give rise to a BFOQ, as enforced by a stringent
"essence of the business" standard whereby courts narrowly define the
fundamental nature of the employer's business. This presumption,
however, is not absolute, as evidenced by the development of the privacy
BFOQ, to which this article now turns.
III. THE PRIVACY BFOQ: AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE AGAINST
CUSTOMER PREFERENCES
Within the general framework described above, courts have carved out
a small exception to deal with cases in which customer preferences for
employees of a particular gender affects their privacy interests. These
cases generally arise in three main contexts: prisons (where the
"customers" are prisoners);14 janitorial settings;75 and healthcare facilities
such as hospitals, medical practices, mental health centers, and gyms. This
article, as noted above, focuses on the privacy BFOQ in the healthcare
world.
In contrast to the general presumption against allowing customer
preferences to create a BFOQ, courts have been quite willing to recognize a
BFOQ when a customer's privacy interests are implicated. They typically
use a two-part test. First, they evaluate whether using employees of a
particular gender implicates the "essence of the business," looking at
whether bodily modesty interests are at stake. Second, they analyze
whether the employer can selectively assign job responsibilities to
minimize the privacy clashes that would otherwise ensue.
The first court to confront this issue in the healthcare context was the
District Court of Delaware, in the case of Fesel v. Masonic Home of
Delaware, Inc.16 In Fesel, the court considered a case in which a male
nurse was suing the Masonic Home, a small nursing home with a
population of twenty-two women and eight men.77 The Masonic Home
73. Id. at 206.
74. See, e.g., Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the dismissal
of male corrections officers' complaint regarding gender-based staffing assignments at a
female prison); Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994) (reversing the dismissal
of male inmate's complaint regarding strip searches conducted by female guards).
75. See, e.g., Hemandez v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1992)
(holding that the defendant university had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether female sex was a BFOQ for custodial work in a women's dormitory); Norwood v.
Dale Maint. Sys., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that male sex was a BFOQ for
a janitorial position in a male restroom during daylight hours).
76. 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978).
77. Id. at 1348.
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(Home) had told the plaintiff that it would not hire a male nurse's aide
because of its belief-supported by documentary evidence from a number
of the Home's female patients and their families-that its female patients
would object to having a male nurse's aide assist them with activities
involving intimate personal care.78 In its motion for summary judgment,
the Home argued that being female was a BFOQ for the position.7 9 The
district court, finding that further factual development was necessary,
denied the Home's motion.8°
At trial, the court directed a verdict for the Home.8 In reaching this
conclusion, the Fesel court first applied the "essence of the business" test,
noting that to prevail, the Home had to demonstrate a factual basis for its
belief that hiring males "would undermine the essence of its business
,,82operation. The court ruled that the Home had satisfied this prong,
stressing the considerable bodily modesty interests at stake:
The Home has the responsibility of providing twenty-four hour
supervision and care of its elderly guests. Fulfillment of that
responsibility necessitates intimate personal care including
dressing, bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes and
catheter care. Each of these functions involves a personal
touching as to which each guest is privileged by law to
discriminate on any basis. Because our tort and criminal laws
recognize these personal privacy interests, the Home cannot
legally force its female guests to accept personal care from males.
Since it is clear that a substantial portion of the female guests will
not consent to such care, it follows that the sex of the nurse's
aides at the Home is crucial to successful job performance."'
The court then recognized an additional prong specific to the establishment
of a privacy BFOQ: the employer must show that "due to the nature of the
operation of the business, it would not be feasible to assign job
responsibilities in a selective manner so as to avoid a collision with the
privacy rights of the customers., 84 Here, too, the Fesel court concluded
that the Home had met its burden.85
The Fesel court's approach has been followed by other courts that
86have addressed similar situations. In Backus v. Baptist Medical Center,
78. Id. at 1352.
79. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 573, 574 (D. Del. 1977).
80. Id. at 574.
81. Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1354.
82. Id. at 1350.
83. Id. at 1352-53.
84. Id. at 1351.
85. Id. at 1353.
86. 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated on other grounds by 671 F.2d 1100
(8th Cir. 1982).
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for example, a male nurse sued after his employer, a hospital, refused his
request for a full-time position in the labor and delivery unit. 7 The
hospital, highlighting the intimate nature of the position (which included
"checking the cervix for dilation, shaving the perineum, giving an enema,
assisting in the expulsion of the enema and sterilizing the vaginal area"),88
argued that female sex was a BFOQ.89 The Backus court, applying the two-
part test used in Fesel, agreed.90
Similarly, in EEOC v. Mercy Health Center, the court was quick to
conclude that female gender was a BFOQ for a staff nurse position in the
labor and delivery area.91 The court stressed that the staff nurses' duties
required "not only substantial contact with the mother's genitalia but also
substantial invasion of the mother's body," 92 and that a substantial number
of patients had expressed discomfort with the use of male nurses.93 The
court also accepted the hospital's contention that it was not feasible to
94assign job duties in a way that would alleviate these concerns.
It is critical to note that not all healthcare cases involve situations
where females are the preferred sex. In Jones v. Hinds General Hospital,95
a female nursing assistant sued her employer after she was laid off even
though male orderlies with less seniority were retained.96 Here, the hospital
did not argue that being male was a BFOQ for the particular nursing
assistant position in question; rather, it argued that having a certain number
of male employees (as nursing assistants and orderlies) was necessary to
protect the privacy interests of its male patients.97 The hospital explained
that various functions performed by nursing assistants or orderlies (such as
catheterization) entailed "the manipulation or exposure of patients'
genitalia or other private areas of their bodies," such that same-gender care
was often needed.98 It argued that because prior to the layoffs the hospital
employed more females than males, it was justified in terminating only
women.99 The court agreed, placing weight on the testimony of one of the
hospital's doctors that some of the older male patients were "terribly
modest and [became] quite upset at the prospect of female nursing
87. Id. at 1192.
88. Id. at 1193.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11256, at *13 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2,
1982).
92. Id. at *5.
93. Id. at *7.
94. Id. at *13.
95. 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
96. Id. at 934.
97. Id. at 935.
98. Id. at 935.
99. Id. at 935.
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assistants viewing or touching their private areas,"' 00 and finding that "there
were no reasonable scheduling alternatives available that could have been
used by the Hospital to preserve privacy interests of male patients."' 0 '
The Supreme Court, without expressly addressing the legitimacy of
the privacy BFOQ, has implied that it might well be valid in certain
circumstances, notwithstanding the stringent "essence of the business"
standard. When Justice White suggested in Automobile Workers v.
Johnson Controls °2 that the Court's strict application of the "essence of the
business" test would render the privacy BFOQ invalid,'0 3 the majority
explicitly disagreed, writing:
Justice White predicts that our reaffirmation of the narrowness of
the BFOQ defense will preclude considerations of privacy as a
basis for sex-based discrimination. We have never addressed
privacy-based sex discrimination and shall not do so here because
the sex-based discrimination at issue today does not involve the
privacy interests of Johnson Controls' customers. Nothing in our
discussion of the "essence of the business test," however,
suggests that sex could not constitute a BFOQ when privacy
interests are implicated.' °4
Thus, both explicitly and implicitly, courts have expressed support for
the argument that customer preferences stemming from privacy interests
are qualitatively different from typical customer preferences for service
from a particular gender. The Backus court, for example, referred to the
"distinction between a privacy right and a mere customer preference."' 5
Why have courts been so much more deferential in these cases? The
courts' explicit language has focused largely on the traditional bodily
modesty interests implicated in these businesses. Beneath the surface,
however, three distinctive features of these cases render them qualitatively
different from the typical customer preference cases.
First, the privacy cases relate to preferences for same-gender service,
rather than a general sentiment that only men or only women belong in a
certain position. This contrasts markedly with cases like Diaz10 6 and
Southwest,10 7 in which the defendant airlines tried to argue that both male
100. Id. at 936.
101. Id. at937.
102. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
103. Id. at 220 n.8 (White, J., concurring) ("The Court's interpretation of the BFOQ
standard also would seem to preclude considerations of privacy as a basis for sex-based
discrimination, since those considerations do not relate directly to an employee's physical
ability to perform the duties of the job.").
104. Id. at 206 n.4.
105. Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
106. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 422 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
107. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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and female passengers were simply more comfortable being served by
women, or that a predominantly male passenger group enjoyed receiving
"tender loving care" from female flight attendants. Such arguments have
two problems: first, they are often correlated with traditional, stereotyped
views about appropriate "gender roles"; and second, they have the potential
to keep one gender entirely out of a field of employment. Had the
defendants in Diaz or Southwest prevailed, males might have been unable
to obtain jobs as flight attendants. On the contrary, the holdings in the
privacy BFOQ cases described above did not have the potential to keep
males or females entirely out of the field of nursing, as illustrated by the
juxtaposition of Backus (female patients' preferences for female intimate
care) and Hinds °8 (male patients' preferences for male intimate care).
Second, in the privacy cases described above, the courts agreed that
the essence of the businesses at issue implicated gender-related privacy
interests. They explicitly emphasized the bodily privacy interests at stake
in the relevant nursing positions. The Backus court, for example, stressed
that the obstetric ward of the hospital was a "unique section," because "[a]n
obstetrical patient constantly has her genitalia exposed."' 9 Similarly, the
Mercy court emphasized that a labor patient would experience "medically
undesired tension" were a male nurse to perform upon her the "sensitive
and intimate duties" inherent in the job.1 o There appears to have been little
doubt in the courts' minds that these intimate duties went to the essence of
the nursing positions at issue.
Third, the courts largely indicated that in their view, malignant or
chauvinistic stereotypes were not driving customer preferences for same-
gender care. This attitude was not universal; the Fesel court stated that it
viewed the elderly women's desire for female nurses as "undoubtedly
attributable to their upbringing and to sexual stereotyping of the past.""'
The other courts, however, suggested that they viewed the preferences for
same-gender care as a natural result of the human inclination toward
modesty, rather than as a result of sexual stereotyping. The Backus court,
for instance, approvingly quoted an employment law treatise's statment
that "[g]iving respect to deep-seated feeling of personal privacy involving
one's own genital area is quite a different matter from catering to the desire
of some male airline passenger to have... an attractive stewardess." '
The Hinds opinion also stressed the modesty concerns at issue, with no
108. Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
109. Backus, 510F. Supp. at 1193.
110. EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12256 at
*12 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982).
111. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (D. Del. 1978).
112. Backus, 510 F. Supp. at 1194 (quoting 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 43.02[3][b] (2d ed. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
EXPANSION OF THE PRIVACY BFOQ
suggestion that it viewed gender bias as playing a role in customer
preferences.' 13 Interestingly, the Mercy court specifically pointed out that
the labor patients had made no complaints "regarding the race or national
origin of the staff nurses or student nurses,"'"14 but had only expressed
concern about their gender. The court likely chose to include this point-
which is otherwise of dubious relevance to the actual issue at hand-
because it wanted to emphasize that the patients were not bigots, but
merely concerned about gender privacy in a particularly intimate realm.
These three factors render the privacy cases qualitatively different
from the typical customer preference cases, such that courts have
appropriately treated them differently. Most commentators, however, have
argued strongly against the privacy BFOQ, contending that it reflects
malignant gender biases. They suggest that the privacy BFOQ contradicts
the purpose of Title VII because it ratifies and "freezes" traditional
attitudes toward appropriate gender roles.
Interestingly, many of these articles were authored during the 1970s
and 1980s, when the privacy BFOQ was first developing, partially in
response to female patients' preferences for female labor nurses. For
example, Michael Sirota wrote in 1977 that:
If Title VII were construed to permit cautious employers to
invoke the privacy claim on behalf of their customers, traditional
employment roles would remain frozen.... While the presence
of members of the opposite sex may initially shock or surprise
customers, repeated exposure eventually may result in customer
acceptance of the new work roles." 5
Eight years later, in response to decisions like Fesel and Backus,
Deborah Calloway wrote that "by embracing third party privacy interests,
the lower courts have unduly broadened the bfoq defense.... By
expanding the defense to encompass privacy interests, courts permit
employers to discriminate on the basis of customer preferences and
community standards regarding appropriate male and female jobs."' 16 Like
Sirota, Calloway was particularly concerned about the potential for the
privacy BFOQ to "freeze" community mores. She wrote:
By enacting Title VII Congress intended to remove artificial
barriers that "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." If the bfoq defense
permits employers to hire employees on the basis of the
community's assumptions, stereotypes and preferences, the
exception swallows the rule because even widely shared social
113. Hinds, 666 F. Supp. at 936.
114. Mercy, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12256, at *7.
115. Sirota, supra note 16, at 1065.
116. Calloway, supra note 16, at 350-5 1.
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norms frequently are motivated by discriminatory animus or the
products of past discrimination.117
Ironically enough, in support of this anti-freezing argument, virtually
all of these commentators explicitly pointed to the prevalence of male OB-
GYNs. They argued that the predominantly male nature of the OB-GYN
profession proved that women's bodily privacy interests were not
prohibitive; thus, any asserted privacy interests in the desire for female
labor nurses were largely a cover for conscious or unconscious
discriminatory views about appropriate gender roles. Calloway, for
instance, noted that "[f]emale patients accept treatment by male doctors
and, when asked, even express a preference for male doctors.... [S]ocial
norms often reflect stereotyped notions of appropriate male and female
roles and privacy interests are asserted when women or men try to break
into occupations traditionally held by the opposite sex.""'8
Carolyn Bratt, writing in 1984, stated:
[F]emale patients may suffer embarrassment from bodily care
provided by male nurses despite their acceptance of treatment by
male gynecologists and obstetricians.
In effect, these patients have an expectation that nurses will be
female and doctors will be male. Surprise and sometimes shock
may occur when a patient discovers females and males
performing non-traditional medical roles." 9
Similarly, Kenneth Kingma wrote in 1980 of Fesel: "Respect existed
for the male gynecologist but not for a male nurse's aide .... [The court's
ruling] perpetuated the prejudiced view toward male aides, and failed to
carry out the forward-looking purposes of Title VII, namely, to prohibit
unfair and stereotyped employment practices.' 2 °
Likewise, Elsa Shartsis, writing in 1985, commented:
[M]ost obstetrician-gynecologists are men, apparently to the
satisfaction of their patients. That men have enjoyed a
paternalistic, managerial status, as compared to that of women, is
an accepted fact in our society.... So while a woman's sense of
bodily privacy may dictate that she refuse gynecological care by
a male physician, the man's traditional professional status
overcomes the patient's reticence. The male nurse, however,
may not share this professional edge.' 2 '
117. Id. at 359 (internal citations omitted).
118. Id. at 361 (internal citations omitted).
119. Bratt, supra note 16, at 946.
120. Kingma, supra note 16, at 590.
121. Shartsis, supra note 16, at 894-95.
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She thus concluded that women's discomfort with male nurses was merely
due to a "cultural lag."'
' 22
Two decades later, there is an obvious irony to these arguments. Now
that women actually have the option of selecting female OB-GYNs, they
are doing so in droves. This phenomenon casts doubt on the frequent
argument that customer preferences for same-gender care necessarily
derive from traditional stereotypes about gender roles. Indeed, quotations
by numerous female patients and OB-GYNS collected from newspaper
articles documenting the trend toward female OB-GYNs suggest that
qualitatively different interests are driving these preferences.
One theme that echoes among many female patients is their desire to
have a doctor who has undergone similar physical experiences, from
gynecological examinations to physical changes such as menopause.
Sandy Hudgins-Brewer, a female nurse practitioner who does
gynecological exams, stated that young females coming in for their first
Pap smear often prefer to see her, because she can relate to their123
concerns. "I remember my first Pap real well and I was scared out of my
mind," she said. 24 She also reported that many menopausal women tell her
that it is difficult to discuss their symptoms with male doctors who have
never experienced menopause.125 Dr. Judith Ortman-Nabi said that when
she was in practice with male physicians, female patients would seek her
out, stating, "'I want to speak with the female doctor. I'm so-and-so's
patient, but since you're a woman you could [sic] talk about
menopause.""126 Amy Gallagher, a patient who has used female OB-GYNs
and nurse-midwives, stated that it was important to her to have a female
healthcare provider during her pregnancy. 12 "There is so much going on
spiritually, emotionally and physically that you need someone who has
been through those experiences before," she explained. 28  Dr. Lauren
Streicher, an OB-GYN practicing in an all-female practice, reported that
patients are particularly attracted to the idea of having obstetricians who
have themselves given birth," 9 a sentiment echoed by patient Peggy
Hamilton. Hamilton explained that her choice to see a female OB-GYN
was "'about going to someone who had had two children and knew what
labor was all about."",1
30
A related theme was that female patients feel more comfortable
122. Id. at 895.
123. Jordan, supra note 10, at 13.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Peradotto, supra note 13, at ID.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Condor, supra note 8, at 8.
130. Ladd, supra note 6, at DI.
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discussing intimate topics with female OB-GYNs. Dr. Sheri Baczkowki
stated that "[w]e see a lot of teen-agers [sic] who have menstrual problems
that they don't want to talk about with a man, or teens who are concerned
about their body image.' '31 Dr. Diana Collins explained that some patients
"want to discuss very personal things, to do with their sex lives, their
libido, things they say 'I couldn't tell a man."" 32 Kristi Amfahr, a patient,
stated that she "[couldn't] imagine talking to a male doctor about sex or
'anything intimate. '" 33  She reflected, "[s]ay there was some really
embarrassing issue I had to talk about, like something hormonal... I
would feel more secure talking to a woman.' 34 In fact, Dr. Linn Parsons,
an OB-GYN professor at Bowman Gray School of Medicine, stated that a
six-month study of male and female residents indicated that female patients
are particularly drawn to female OB-GYNs when their medical needs
implicate therapeutic concerns. She reported that women patients seemed
to choose "women doctors based on what their complaint was," as
evidenced by the fact that the female residents "saw more menopausal
complaints, PMS, marital and sexual problems-the type of problem[s] that
often take[ ] a lot more time in terms of counseling."' 35
That the choice of female OB-GYNs is not simply due to traditional
mores or stereotypes is underscored by the fact that many patients, such as
Lewis, Hudgins-Brewer, Morgan-Mann, Ruth Bergdorf,3 6 Pat Kellogg
Friedman,"' Judy Kaven, I Rachel Powers, 1
39 and Barbara Sprnill' 4°
reported switching from a male OB-GYN to a female one, sometimes after
many years of having seen a male physician. This suggests that even after
overcoming any inhibitions about being physically examined by a male
OB-GYN, these patients were still attracted to the idea of a female OB-
GYN. It also suggests that the choice of a female OB-GYN is often due
not to uninformed stereotypes, but informed experience. Both of these
points stand in contrast to commentators' suggestions that once patients get
131. Peradotto, supra note 13, at ID.
132. Ladd, supra note 6, at DL.
133. Carnahan, supra note 8, at 8F.
134. Id.
135. Ladd, supra note 6, at D1.
136. See Jacobs, supra note 9, at 60 (stating that Ruth Bergdorf switched to a female
OB-GYN at age thirty-seven).
137. See Andrea Gerlin, Is the Male Gynecologist Going Extinct?, CHATrANOOGA TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1996, at D1 (interviewing a woman who said that she switched from a male to a
female OB-GYN because the male OB-GYN appeared to be insensitive).
138. See Carnahan, supra note 8, at 9F (noting that Judy Kaven saw the same male OB-
GYN for seventeen years and then switched to a female OB-GYN).
139. See Condor, supra note 8, at 1 (stating that Powers saw a male OB-GYN for four
years and then switched to a female OB-GYN).
140. See Ladd, supra note 6, at D1 (reporting that Spruill switched from a male to a
female OB-GYN after moving to a new city).
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used to healthcare from the opposite sex, or get over their traditional
conceptions about gender roles, they will no longer prefer same-gender
141care.
Nonetheless, in a recent resurgence of articles published on the topic
of the privacy BFOQ, commentators have continued to argue that
preferences for same-sex healthcare derive from and reinforce gender
stereotypes, without substantive consideration of the current trend toward
female OB-GYNs, the expressed reasons for that trend, or whether those
reasons contribute anything to the analysis. Amy Kapcynzki, for example,
argues that:
Same-sex privacy cases ... reinforce a symbolic order of gender
that has a discriminatory effect upon women, because, for
example, it casts them as constitutively vulnerable to sexualized
attack, and as essentially and necessarily modest in a way that
resonates with tendencies to propertize women and deny them
sexual agency.142
Kapcynzki further attacks as illogical any argument that cross-sex
observation of one's naked body is more intrusive than observation by a
member of the same sex. 143 She therefore argues that the same-sex privacy
BFOQ should "rarely, if ever, be judged legitimate.
'44
Similarly, Sharon McGowan argues that underlying the privacy BFOQ
are the problematic normative assumptions that a woman's modesty
deserves special protection and that cross-sex observation is particularly
harmful and degrading. 45 McGowan therefore supports abolition of the
privacy BFOQ outside of the prison context, where concerns about rape of
female prisoners may warrant it.' 46  Jillian B. Berman also advocates
constriction of the privacy BFOQ in the healthcare setting, arguing that
"sex says little about a doctor's qualifications and selecting a doctor
because of her sex perpetuates privacy norms and invidious
discrimination.' 47
These commentators' arguments largely track those made by
commentators in the 1970s and 1980s, with relatively little attention given
either to the changes in the landscape since that time, or to possible
reformulations of the privacy BFOQ that might address several of their
chief concerns. Kapcynzki, for example, questions how it can "be more or
141. See, e.g., Sirota, supra note 16, at 1065 ("While the presence of members of the
opposite sex may initially shock or surprise customers, repeated exposure eventually may
result in customer acceptance of the new work roles.").
142. Kapcynzki, supra note 17, at 1261-62.
143. Id. at 1269-70.
144. Id. at 1262.
145. McGowan, supra note 17, at 100-08.
146. Id. at 79.
147. Berman. supra note 17, at 773-74.
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less private-as opposed to comfortable, intuitive, pleasing, or
embarrassing-to be seen in a state of undress by a male nurse rather than
by a male doctor." '  The possibility that the privacy BFOQ could,
however, be expanded to encompass OB-GYNs receives limited
consideration. Berman does acknowledge the possibility, but quickly
rejects it;"' Kapcynzki notes the trend toward female OB-GYNs in a
footnote, but simply posits that courts likely "would not be persuaded that
female patients' privacy rights are grounds for BFOQs in these cases, in
large part because women have long been attended to by male ob-gyns.' 5 °
Similarly, although Kapcynzki and McGowan argue that the privacy BFOQ
reinforces notions of women's sexual vulnerability and modesty, 5' they do
not consider the extent to which this concern could be addressed through
the application of a privacy BFOQ on a gender-neutral basis, as in Jones v.
Hinds General Hospital.152
More broadly, neither Kapcynzki, McGowan, nor Berman delve into
the actual reasons expressed by women who have sought out female OB-
GYNs. Instead, they apparently assume that such preferences derive from
the irrational belief that a greater infringement of privacy results from
cross-sex observation of one's nude body. Putting aside the question of
whether such a belief is irrational (and whether, if it is, Title VII should be
concerned with its eradication) this argument fails to take account of the
myriad reasons that actual women have given for their choice of a female
OB-GYN, and the fact that concerns about bodily modesty are often not at
the top of the list.
This article's exploration of the reasons underlying the trend toward
female OB-GYNs leads to its conclusion-in direct contrast to the bulk of
commentary on the subject-that the courts should go even further in
establishing the privacy BFOQ defense. Instead of focusing their inquiry
on whether bodily modesty interests are implicated, and making such a
determination the necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a privacy
BFOQ, the courts should instead bring to the forefront the three basic
principles outlined above and make them the explicit criteria for the
privacy BFOQ. That is, the privacy BFOQ should apply in all instances
148. Kapcynzki, supra note 17, at 1270.
149. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 17, at 772-73 ("Extending the privacy BFOQ to male
obstetricians and gynecologists would have the perverse effect of resexualizing the
profession .... Given this country's commitment to equal employment, the privacy BFOQ
should not be extended to physicians absent a compelling justification.").
150. Kapcynzki, supra note 17, at 1265 n.49, 1266.
151. See id. at 1284-85 (arguing that courts rely on traditional notions of chastity that
restrict women's sexual autonomy); McGowan, supra note 17, at 98-99 (discussing the
court's view of the potential for trauma and anxiety for women, as compared to men, if
subjected to cross-sex observation).
152. 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
EXPANSION OF THE PRIVACY BFOQ
where courts find that customers have: (1) a preference for same-gender
care in (2) a business that itself implicates privacy or therapeutic interests
that are specifically gender-related,' and (3) the preference is not based
on, and does not perpetuate, malignant characterizations of the genders.'
15 4
Under the current doctrine, this is largely not occurring, since most
courts regard the privacy BFOQ as limited to cases in which customers
appear nude before employees. The formative privacy BFOQ cases, such
as Backus'55 and Mercy, 156 all emphasized the physically intimate nature of
the jobs at issue, and several courts have described the privacy BFOQ as
protecting only bodily privacy. 57 When faced with customer preferences
153. Thus, the preference of a particular supervisor or customer for employees of the
same gender would be insufficient; the business itself must be explicitly gender-related.
154. This final concern has been emphasized by commentators who argue that in certain
instances, differential treatment on the basis of gender should be permissible. For example,
Chai R. Feldblum, Nancy Fredman Krent, and Virginia G. Watkin have argued that all-
female organizations (such as schools or youth activities) should be permitted under a
"compensatory purpose" rationale if they satisfy the following four-pronged test:
(1) there is a sex-based disadvantage suffered by [the group's] membership
related to its basis of classification; (2) the intention in forming or continuing
the organization is to compensate for this disadvantage; (3) the organization's
programs and policies are not based upon and do not perpetuate archaic and
stereotypical notions of the abilities or roles of the sexes; and (4) it is the
organization's single-sex policy and programs that directly and substantially
help its members compensate for the previous disadvantages.
Chai R. Feldblum, et al., Legal Challenges to All-Female Organizations, 21 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 171, 219 (1986) (emphasis added).
Similarly, Ruth Colker has argued that the principle of anti-subordination should be
brought to the forefront of equal protection jurisprudence, arguing that "race- and sex-based
equal protection doctrine emerged from a concern for the subordination of blacks and
women" and that "a race- or sex-specific rule could be viewed as a positive step towards
eliminating race- or sex-based inequalities, as redressing subordination rather than creating
differentiation." Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1058-59 (1986). Specifically, Colker proposes that a
gender-based policy should not be presumed invalid unless it produces a negative disparate
impact on a single sex, and that even if it does produce such an impact, the policy should
still be held constitutional if its purpose has a "powerful impact on redressing
subordination." Id. at 1060.
This article's proposal echoes those advanced by these articles in its concern for the
potentially subordinating effects of gender-based preferences. It differs from them,
however, in an important respect, satisfaction of the three-prong standard proposed by this
article does not hinge on-in fact, does not even consider-the existence of a history of
subordination and the need to remedy that history. Rather, this article's point is that there
are other reasons for gender-based preferences that should legitimately be taken into
account and given effect, as long as doing so will not result in subordination.
155. Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
156. EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12256
(W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982).
157. See, e.g., Olsen v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1060 (D. Ariz. 1999)
(noting that "[allthough the inquiry into whether sex constitutes a BFOQ usually focuses on
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for same-gender healthcare that relate more to therapeutic interests than to
physical modesty concerns, courts have typically shown little deference. In
EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp.,'58 for example, the court rejected a weight loss
center's claim that female sex was a BFOQ. 15 9 The center, whose clientele
was ninety-five percent female, employed exclusively female counselors,
largely for therapeutic purposes. 160 As the court explained:
The customers who attend Physicians Weight Loss centers are
seeking help and guidance to lose weight. Often weight loss is a
difficult endeavor for them and they need help and guidance to
succeed. The customers may have failed in losing weight on
their own and may suffer from low self-esteem. Embarrassment
about their bodies and a reluctance to let others know their
weight and measurements may also be experienced by the
customers. Counselors at Physicians Weight Loss may serve as
role models and motivators for customers. Often counselors have
had their own personal weight loss experience and have faced the
same challenges the customers face.
Some female customers of Physicians Weight Loss object to
having their measurements, whether by tape or caliper, taken by a
man and would not feel comfortable discussing emotional and
physiological issues associated with weight loss with a man.
These emotional and physiological issues may involve sexual
relationships and physical issues uniquely related to women.161
Despite the court's apparent acceptance of this argument, it still rejected
the center's claim that being female was a BFOQ for the counseling
positions. The court explicitly rejected the "proposition that Physicians
Weight Loss customers have a privacy interest that extends to the
counseling function"'' 62 and indicated that only bodily privacy interests
were relevant to the analysis. It then stressed that the bodily privacy
interests at stake were minimal, because the body measurements were taken
key job skills or the employer's central mission, courts also have found an employee's sex
to be a BFOQ in certain situations in which a customer's or client's bodily privacy interests
might otherwise be compromised."); see also EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291, 1296
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (reducing the issue of whether female sex was a BFOQ for instructor
positions in a women's health club to the question of whether the "touching at issue" in the
relevant positions-namely, "touching clients on their breasts, inner thighs, buttocks, and
crotch area when taking measurements and instructing members on the use of equipment
and proper exercise form"-implicated protectable privacy interests, or whether only cases
involving "exposure to nudity, touching of genitals, and observance of private bodily
functions" could rise to that level).
158. 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Miss. 1996).
159. Id. at 305-06.
160. Id. at 302-03.
161. Id. at 303.
162. Id. at 304.
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through clothing and could even be taken by the women themselves if they
felt uncomfortable with having the counselor take them.
163
Similarly, in Jatczak v. Ochburg,'64 the court also essentially rejected
the notion that therapeutic interests served by same-gender care could
justify a BFOQ. There, a female filed suit after being denied, on the basis
of gender, a child-care worker position at a community mental health
program for young adults that was an outpatient facility of the Michigan
Department of Health. 65 The position involved teaching appropriate work
skills and behavior to mentally ill young adults, ninety-five percent of
whom were male, to assist them in obtaining "employment in the outside
world."'166 The director of the program had obtained permission from the
Civil Service to classify the position as "male only" because of the need for
a male role model to demonstrate and exemplify appropriate work behavior
to the predominantly male population, the importance of providing a male
figure to the majority of male patients who lacked a father or other similar
significant males in their lives, the need to have a male present to counsel
the male patients on the topic of male sexuality, and the concern that many
of the male patients had previously had negative experiences with females
in positions of authority.16 The director of the program testified that "it
was absolutely essential that the position in question be filled by a male.' 68
Nonetheless, the Jatczak court rejected the argument that male sex was a
BFOQ for the position.169 It stressed that the position involved "no
responsibility for intimate body contact with the clientele," and found that
"[a]ny counseling provided by the worker was purely incidental."
70
This article does not mean to suggest that courts always minimize the
therapeutic interests implicated in same-gender care. On the contrary, two
cases-City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission 7' and Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hospital 72-illustrate
how courts can appropriately take such interests into account in their
assessment. In City of Philadelphia, Philadelphia argued that female
gender was a BFOQ for the positions in its juvenile hall facility that
involved supervision of females, and that male gender was a BFOQ for the
163. Id.
164. 540 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
165. Id. at 700.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 701.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 704-05.
170. Id. at 704.
171. 300 A.2d 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). This case was decided under state law rather
than Title VII. Because the court interpreted the state anti-discrimination law's BFOQ
provision using federal precedent, however, this distinction is essentially irrelevant. See id.
at 100 n.3.
172. 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1996).
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positions involving supervision of males.'73  The court accepted this
argument, noting not only the physical privacy interests at stake (since
supervisors sometimes had to supervise daily showers and perform full
body searches for contraband) 174 but also the therapeutic interests
implicated by the position. The court explained:
It is the role of the Supervisor to gain the confidence and the
respect of the children in order to aid them in regaining a proper
perspective of the trying problems of growing up in a dangerous,
hostile, competitive world. The Commission cannot expect the
City to produce cold, empirical facts to show that girls and boys
at this age relate better to Supervisors of the same sex. It is
common sense that a young girl with a sexual or emotional
problem will usually approach someone of her own sex, possibly
her mother, seeking comfort and answers .... A like situation
prevails for the boys. To expect a female or a male supervisor to
gain the confidence of troubled youths of the opposite sex in
order to be able to alleviate emotional and sexual problems is to
expect the impossible.
175
Thus, the court found that these interests justified gender-based
BFOQs for the positions, 76 albeit over a strong dissent arguing that the
positions in question "involve[d] dealings with the children when they are
in various states of undress only to a minimal extent,"'177 and that there was
no reason to think that "women cannot handle security or counseling
problems for the boys" or vice versa.171
Similarly, in the more recent Healey case, the Third Circuit explicitly
stated that therapeutic considerations had influenced its BFOQ analysis. 79
Southwood Psychiatric Hospital (Southwood) was treating emotionally
disturbed and sexually abused male and female adolescents and children.
180
It maintained a policy of gender-based staff assignment to ensure that at
least one female and one male were present on every shift.' This policy
resulted in the reassignment of the plaintiff, a child care specialist, to a less
desirable shift, and she brought a Title VII action against Southwood.
182
Southwood argued that its gender-based staffing policy was justified as a
BFOQ, noting both the physical privacy and therapeutic interests at
173. City of Phila., 300 A.2d at 99.
174. Id. at 101.
175. Id. at 103.
176. Id. at 104.
177. Id. at 105 (Blatt, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 106 (Blatt, J., dissenting).
179. Healey, 78 F.3d at 133.
180. Id. at 130.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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stake. 8 3 It asserted that role modeling was an important aspect of the
staffers' role, 84 and also claimed that a balanced staff was "necessary
because children who have been sexually abused will disclose their
problems more easily to a member of a certain sex.'1 5 The court found
that "due to both therapeutic and privacy concerns," Southwood had indeed
established a gender-based BFOQ, ruling that both factors went to the
essence of Southwood's business.1
86
City of Philadelphia and Healey, however, represent exceptions to the
general presumption that a privacy BFOQ can only be established in
response to bodily modesty interests. It is time for the rest of the courts to
abandon this limitation. The case law's emphasis on the "essence of the
business" test highlights what should be viewed as the fundamental
purpose of Title VII: to prevent prejudice and stereotypes from blocking
equally qualified employees from work. Although Johnson Controls
certainly reiterated that the "essence of the business" test is intended to be
stringent, nothing in its discussion of the "essence of the business" test
foreclosed the validity of the privacy BFOQ, as the majority specifically
pointed out. 187 Rather, the strictness of the Court's application of the test
lay in its unwillingness to validate BFOQs that were not related to
occupational issues-that is, those "job-related skills and aptitudes... that
affect an employee's ability to do the job."'
' 88
Focusing on the healthcare context, this article has identified several
ways in which being of a particular gender can directly affect an
employee's ability to do the job. First, same-gender counselors often have
a better ability to serve as role models. This heightened ability can take on
great importance in the gym or mental health setting, as the defendants in
Hi 40 Corp. and Healey described with respect to females, and as the
defendants in Jatczak described with respect to males.
Second, patients frequently are more comfortable and willing to
discuss intimate, gender-specific topics with physicians and counselors of
the same gender, as illustrated by the quotations of many patients in the
articles discussed above, and as alluded to by the City of Philadelphia
court. This interest can be seen as implicating a type of "psychological"
privacy that is sometimes even more significant to patients than is physical
privacy. It is obvious that the more willing patients are to share their
183. Id.
184. Id. at 133.
185. Id. Southwood did not claim that females would always disclose their problems
more easily to females or that males would necessarily be more forthcoming with males;
rather, it claimed that the preferred sex would depend on the child's sex as well as the sex of
the person who had abused him or her. Id.
186. Id. at 134.
187. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 206 n.4.
188. Id. at201.
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gender-related concerns with their healthcare providers, the more complete
and effective their healthcare will be. Unlike airline service, in which
flight attendants' respective "soothing" abilities are largely tangential to the
essence of the business, a patient's willingness-or lack thereof-to raise
health-related concerns and questions with his or her healthcare provider
goes directly to the heart of the healthcare business. If a healthcare
provider is not fully informed about all of the health problems plaguing a
patient, he or she cannot provide that patient with effective care.
Third, same-gender healthcare providers have the advantage of shared
physicality. As numerous patients and physicians described, the first-hand
experience with gynecological examinations, menstruation, menopause,
and pregnancy that female OB-GYNs often possess can often make them
more effective caregivers. As Dr. Wendy Pesterfield put it, "'I've been
there. I've had menstrual cramps. I've had labor pains. I've had morning
sickness. I think while men can be very good ob/gyns and can be
sympathetic, I don't know that they could have the empathy and
understanding that a female could have."'1 89 By the same token, Dr. Judith
Ortman-Nabi noted that "'if you take the example of urologists, the
majority are male. ... A woman urologist would have no idea what it feels
like to have trouble voiding because of a prostate that's big, just as a man
can't relate to what some women are going through."" 90
This is not to say that female gender is a necessity for OB-GYNs and
diet counselors in all-female gyms, nor that male gender is a necessity for
urologists. Rather, this article's argument is that preferences for same-
gender healthcare that relate to physical modesty should not be given more
deference than preferences relating to therapeutic interests, and, moreover,
that neither type of preference should be dismissed as simply masking
malignant, stereotypical attitudes about appropriate gender roles. Both
types of preferences clearly relate directly to the essence of many
healthcare businesses, and neither relies on nor perpetuates a chauvinistic
conception of the genders. Thus, both types of interests would satisfy the
second prong of the proposed three-prong BFOQ test and-if the other two
prongs were also met-would entitle an employer to take gender into
account when making employment decisions.
IV. THE CASE OF THE MALE OB-GYN: How WOULD, AND SHOULD, IT
BE RESOLVED?
Having outlined the proposal for a reformulated privacy BFOQ, this
189. Carnahan, supra note 8, at 9F.
190. Peradotto, supra note 13, at ID.
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article now returns to the specific question of the male OB-GYN. A
comparison of the ways in which the current privacy BFOQ doctrine and
this article's revised BFOQ doctrine would analyze this issue provides
support for this article's proposal.
As of yet, courts have not had to rule on whether female sex can
qualify as a BFOQ for OB-GYNs and thus justify even explicit gender
discrimination in employment decisions. Dr. Garfinkel's case, brought in
1998 under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 91 (whose relevant
language tracks that of Title VII almost exactly) 192, has not been addressed
on the merits due to the procedural questions. 193 Meanwhile, two courts in
the Second Circuit have heard cases brought by male OB-GYNs claiming
gender discrimination, but neither court ended up reaching the fundamental
issue. In Underkofler v. Community Health Care Plan, Inc.,1 9 4 a male OB-
GYN claimed that he had been terminated because of his gender and
replaced by a female. 95 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the defendant, finding that the defendant had
offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (poor job performance) for
the plaintiff's termination.' 96
In Veleanu v. Beth Israel Medical Center,197 the court came closer to
reaching the fundamental question. There, a male OB-GYN charged that
he had been terminated because his defendant employer (a faculty practice
group of OB-GYNs affiliated with Beth Israel Medical Center) "sought to
establish a staff of younger, female physicians."'98 In support of his gender
discrimination claim, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had hired a
female employee to replace him,' 99 and also pointed to the defendant's
willingness to accommodate female patients who requested female OB-
GYNs2 °
The Veleanu court found that neither of these arguments raised an
inference of gender discrimination.20 ' First, it found that the evidence did
not support plaintiff's argument that the new female employee had been
191. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 et seq. (West 2003).
192. See, e.g., Spragg v. Shore Care, 679 A.2d 685, 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(stating that "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains a BFOQ provision virtually
identical to ours.").
193. See Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 773 A.2d 665, 667
(N.J. 2001) (holding that plaintiff's gender discrimination claim was not subject to
arbitration and could proceed in a court of law).
194. No. 99-7838, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19040, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2000).
195. Id. at *2.
196. Id. at *5-*7.
197. 98 Civ. 7455 (VM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13948, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000).
198. Id. at *3.
199. Id. at *25.
200. Id. at *22.
201. Id. at *23-*38.
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202specifically hired to replace him. More interestingly, in response to the
plaintiffs argument about the defendant's accommodation of female
patients, the court stated that such accommodations were appropriate
because of the personal privacy interests inherent. °3 Appealing to Backus,
Fesel, and Jones, the court noted that OB-GYNs provide "intimate and
sensitive personal care to a women's [sic] body," and that such care
"implicates the patients' privacy rights, personal dignity and self-
respect. °  The court concluded that individual accommodations of
patients' preferences were legitimate and did not give rise to an inference
of discrimination against the plaintiff.2 5  The court did not address,
however, whether it would be permissible for a medical facility not only to
accommodate those female patients who specifically requested female OB-
GYNs, but also to take gender into account in employment decisions
generally. Indeed, the court stated that it "need not address the permissible
bounds to which this principle [the legality of accommodating female
patients' requests] may carry. 20 6
How will the first court that must address these boundaries rule? In
fact, the existing doctrine does not provide a clear indication of the answer.
Depending on its sympathies, a court could easily find justification for
ruling either way. On the one hand, a defendant employer could make a
good argument that the privacy BFOQ justifies gender-based employment
decisions regarding OB-GYNs. It could highlight the considerable bodily
modesty interests at stake, and could also appeal to precedents like Backus
and Mercy. If female gender is a BFOQ for labor nurses, the defendant
would argue, why not for OB-GYNs themselves? The Veleanu court's
language indicates that it might have been sympathetic to such an
argument, although it is far from certain that this would have been the
outcome.
Indeed, a male plaintiff could make strong counter-arguments. First,
he could point to the predominance of males in the OB-GYN field. It is
difficult-indeed, virtually impossible-to make a credible argument that
male OB-GYNs are incapable of doing their jobs, given that at least as of
2001, the majority of OB-GYNs were still male.20 7 This phenomenon
places the court in a more difficult position than that faced by the Backus
and Mercy courts, since labor nurses have long been female.20 8
202. Id. at *25.
203. Id. at *22-*24.
204. Id. at *23.
205. Id. at *23-*25.
206. Id. at *24-*25.
207. Lewin, supra note 6, at Al (noting that as of 2001, sixty-four percent of the
physicians practicing obstetrics and gynecology were male).
208. See, e.g., LEAviTT, supra note 30, at 171-95 (describing how until the mid-
twentieth century, childbirth in the United States took place most often in the home, assisted
EXPANSION OF THE PRIVACY BFOQ
Additionally, a male OB-GYN could point out that courts applying the
privacy BFOQ typically conceive of it as protecting physical privacy, and
that the evidence indicates that this is not the primary concern of OB-GYN
patients. As discussed above, most patients' statements indicate that their
preferences for female OB-GYNs stem largely from interests relating to
psychological comfort. For both of these reasons, the court addressing this
case will not have the luxury, as the Backus and Mercy courts did, of
resting its holding on traditional mores about women's bodily modesty.
The inability of the existing doctrine to satisfactorily resolve this
question indicates a fundamental weakness in its approach. Given the
doctrine's emphasis on those privacy interests that are deeply ingrained in
tradition, a male OB-GYN may well convince the courts that female sex
simply cannot be a BFOQ for OB-GYNs. But such a finding would be
ironic in no small sense. Were a court to decide that female sex is not a
BFOQ for OB-GYNs, we would be left with the troubling result that being
female is a BFOQ for labor nurses, but not for the physician who actually
delivers the baby. It is that result that would truly freeze societal attitudes,
by giving inappropriate deference to a history shaped by gender bias. On
the other hand, for a court to decide that being female is now a BFOQ for
OB-GYNs would undeniably seem inconsistent with the current conception
of the privacy BFOQ as a very narrow, tightly constrained exception.
Technically, of course, such a holding could be justified solely on grounds
that nudity is implicated in a gynecological examination. But this rationale
is problematic not only because there is proof that bodily modesty interests
are not prohibitive in this context, but also because it represents a narrow,
overly formalistic approach to a profound question about how far we want
Title VII's anti-discrimination mandate to reach. The reformulated BFOQ
would provide a more satisfactory approach toward resolving this question,
by explicitly expanding the privacy BFOQ on a principled basis and
acknowledging that it goes beyond instances where gender is an absolute or
virtual necessity.
Using this article's three-prong test to determine whether female sex is
a BFOQ for OB-GYNs would yield a straightforward answer: yes. The
first prong would clearly be satisfied. Only females see OB-GYNs; thus,
this issue implicates a preference for same-gender healthcare, rather than a
general view that only males or only females should be physicians. Indeed,
although a finding that female sex is a BFOQ for OB-GYNs might further
discourage men from specializing in this field, it would certainly not keep
them out of the general field of medicine. The second criterion is also met,
as significant gender-related privacy and therapeutic interests are by
by female "helpers" and midwives; childbirth then moved to hospitals, under the direction
of male obstetricians and amid "the bustle of [nurses wearing] starched skirts").
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definition implicated in the OB-GYN field, as described above. The third
prong would be satisfied as well, because this preference does not derive
from malignant gender stereotypes about men. There is no evidence that
any of the female patients seeking a female OB-GYN refuse to see male
physicians for other medical matters, or that they believe men are less
intelligent or competent physicians. On the contrary, the evidence
indicates that women are specifically seeking out female physicians for the
particular aspect of medical care that is the most intimate and gender-
specific. Moreover, as discussed above, the fact that so many women used
a male OB-GYN for years before switching to a female OB-GYN
underscores that this preference is not based on malignant or ignorant
biases.
This proposal's straightforward resolution of the question should not
be seen as reflecting callousness toward the plight of male OB-GYNs.
There is no question that the broadened BFOQ defense proposed by this
article would impose harms on the non-preferred sex in various healthcare
employment settings, and this is a definite cost. That said, the statutory
recognition of the BFOQ defense to gender discrimination, the legislative
history's explicit indication that concern about respecting patients'
preferences for same-gender healthcare helped to bring about that defense,
and the recent data regarding patients' (emphatically non-chauvinistic)
reasons for preferring same-gender healthcare all militate in favor of a
robust application of the defense in the healthcare context. Accordingly,
this article disagrees with the sentiments of one frustrated male OB-GYN
who stated that, "'I've learned that they're not looking for me if the ad says
they need an ob-gyn in an all-female practice .... I don't see how it's
different from an ad saying 'physician wanted to join all-Caucasian
practice' .- 209 This article contends that there is a real difference-and that
the doctrine should be developed accordingly.
209. Lewin, supra note 6, at A14.
